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Abstract:  
Although they have developed very much in isolation from each other, we argue the theory of 
entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm are closely related, and each has much to 
learn from the other.  In particular, the notion of entrepreneurship as judgment associated with 
Frank Knight and some Austrian school economists aligns naturally with the theory of the firm.  
In this perspective, the entrepreneur needs a firm, that is, a set of alienable assets he controls, to 
carry out his function.  We further show how this notion of judgment adds to the key themes in 
the modern theory of the firm (i.e., the existence, boundaries, and internal organization).  In our 
approach, resource uses are not data, but are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of 
using assets to produce goods.  The entrepreneur’s decision problem is aggravated by the fact 
that capital assets are heterogeneous. Asset ownership facilitates experimenting 
entrepreneurship: Acquiring a bundle of property rights is a low cost means of carrying out 
commercial experimentation.   In this approach, the existence of the firm may be understood in 
terms of limits to the market for judgment relating to novel uses of heterogeneous assets; and the 
boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of internal organization, may be understood as being 
responsive to entrepreneurial processes of experimentation.   
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Introduction 
Do entrepreneurs need business firms to carry out their function?  Are business firms 
run by entrepreneurs, or by hired managers?  Economists have been thinking and 
writing about entrepreneurship since at least the 18th century.  Within the last few 
decades, the theory of the firm has become one of the fastest growing areas in ap-
plied microeconomics.  And yet, surprisingly, the above questions have rarely been 
asked.  The modern economic theory of the firm virtually ignores entrepreneurship, 
while the literature on entrepreneurship in economics and strategic management has 
limited use for the economic theory of the firm.1 
This lack of contact between two fields that seem to overlap so naturally re-
sults partly from the development of economic thought.  The economic theory of the 
firm emerged and took shape as the entrepreneur was being banished from micro-
economic analysis, first in the 1930s when the firm was subsumed into neoclassical 
price theory (O’Brien 1984), and then in the 1980s as the theory of the firm was re-
formulated in the language of game theory and the economics of information.  The 
gradual “hardening” of the neoclassical approach in economics, including the main-
stream approach to the theory of the firm, left, little room for the entrepreneurship, 
which Baumol (1993b: 17) calls “the specter which haunts economic models.”  In 
modern contributions to the theory of the firm from Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996), 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Hart (1995), and others reference to entrepreneurship is 
passing at best.  These approaches are largely static and “closed,” meaning that they 
focus on solutions to given optimization problems, avoiding questions about the ori-
gin of the problem at hand, or indeed of the firm itself.  Agency theory, for example, 
has generated important insights on the effects of incentives on effort and the rela-
tionship between incentive pay and risk.  In explaining how a principal gets an agent 
to do something, however, the theory overlooks the more fundamental question of 
what the principal should want the agent to do, or indeed, how the principal got to be 
a principal in the first place. 
We argue that the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm are 
closely related, and that each has much to learn from the other.  We begin by survey-
ing various approaches to entrepreneurship in the economics literature, asking to 
what extent the entrepreneur needs a firm (a set of alienable assets he controls) to 
carry out his function (“Does the Entrepreneur Need a Firm?”).  We conclude that only 
the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment has a direct and natural link to the theory 
of the firm. Because markets for judgment are closed, the exercise of judgment re-
quires starting a firm; moreover, judgment implies asset ownership.  Next, we review 
briefly the main themes in the modern theory of the firm (existence, boundaries, and 
internal organization) and show how the notion of entrepreneurship as judgment 
                                                 
1 The terms “entrepreneur” and “entrepreneurship” do not even appear in the indexes of leading texts 
on the economics of organization and management such as Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (2004) or 
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2004). Two British surveys of economics principles text-
books (Kent, 1989; Kent and Rushing, 1999) confirm a similar absence of the concept. 
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illuminates these issues in novel ways (“Putting Entrepreneurship into the Theory of the 
Firm: Judgment and Economic Organization”).  To develop a judgment-based approach 
to economic organization, we also draw on ideas from Austrian economics (Mises 
1949; Kirzner 1973; Salerno 1993)  the body of economics that is perhaps most inti-
mately connected to ideas on entrepreneurship  and on property rights economics 
(Hart 1995; Barzel 1997), an important part of modern organizational economics.  In 
our approach, resource uses are not data, but are created as entrepreneurs envision 
new ways of using assets to produce goods.  The entrepreneur’s decision problem is 
aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not immediately 
obvious how they should be combined. Asset ownership facilitates experimenting 
entrepreneurship: Acquiring a bundle of property rights is a low cost means of carry-
ing out commercial experimentation.   
A number of unconventional insights emerge from this approach.  First, we 
argue that the existence of the firm may be understood in terms of limits of the mar-
ket for judgments relating to how heterogeneous assets may be combined to meet 
future wants.  Second, we argue that the boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of 
internal organization, may be understood as being responsive to entrepreneurial 
processes of experimentation.  In this connection, we introduce a distinction between 
productive and destructive entrepreneurship and argue that it is useful for under-
standing the economic shaping of internal organization.   
 
 
Does the Entrepreneur Need a Firm?  
The Firm and the Entrepreneur in Economics 
Because the entrepreneur in many ways personifies market forces, one might 
expect him to be the central figure in economics. Similarly, because most 
entrepreneurial ventures somehow involve a firm, entrepreneurship in the context of 
firm organization would seem to be a central subject in the theory of markets.  While 
classical economists such as Adam Smith and, particularly, Jean-Baptiste Say reasoned 
this way, it is hardly characteristic of modern economics. 2 The historian of economic 
thought Paul McNulty (1984: 240) notes that  
The perfection of the concept of competition . . . which was at the heart of 
the development of economics as a science during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, led on the one hand to an increasingly rigorous 
analytical treatment of market processes and on the other hand to an in-
creasingly passive role for the firm.  
                                                 
2 As Machovec (1995: 109) notes, to the classical economists “specialization and commercial freedom 
spawned opportunities for alert individuals.”  Unlike later economists, the classical economists held 
what is essentially a process view in which competition was seen “as a tapestry of aggressive com-
mercial behaviors which created pure profits by speculating on price futures, engineering new meth-
ods of production, and inspiring new product lines to better serve consumers” (ibid.: 136).    
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The “increasingly rigorous analytical treatment” of markets, notably in the 
form of general equilibrium theory, not only made firms increasingly “passive,” it 
also made the model of the firm increasingly stylized and anonymous, doing away 
with those dynamic aspects of markets that are most closely related to entrepreneur-
ship (O’Brien 1984).  In particular, the development of what came to be known as the 
“production function view” (Williamson, 1985; Langlois and Foss 1999) — roughly, 
the firm as it is presented in intermediate microeconomics textbooks with its fully 
transparent production possibility sets — was a deathblow to the theory of entrepre-
neurship in the context of firm organization.  If any firm can do what any other firm 
does (Demsetz 1991), if all firms are always on their production possibility frontier, 
and if firms always make their equilibrium choices of input combinations and output 
levels, then there is no room for entrepreneurship.  
As this has been the dominant view of the firm in economics at least since the 
1930s, it is not surprising that much of the important work on the economics of en-
trepreneurship was done prior to this period (e.g., Schumpeter), and that more recent 
work by economists on entrepreneurship has been done largely outside of the con-
fines of mainstream economics (e.g., Kirzner).  However, as we argue later, advances 
in economics over the last two to three decades have left economics somewhat better 
equipped to deal with entrepreneurship and to incorporate it into models of firm 
organization.   
Our approach below is to ask if the entrepreneur needs a firm, and if so, 
whether firm and industry structure affect what entrepreneurs do.  The answers are 
not obvious.  Some approaches to entrepreneurship — Schumpeter’s concept of the 
entrepreneur as innovator, for instance — treat the entrepreneur as an uncaused 
cause, a pure genius who operates outside the usual constraints imposed by resource 
owners and other market participants and is thus unaffected by the firm.  Other ap-
proaches treat entrepreneurs as skilled managers, exercising their entrepreneurial 
talents through skillful arrangements of productive factors, thus being an integral 
part of the firm’s operation.3 
Concepts of Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship as management. In the entrepreneurship curriculum of 
many business schools, the phenomenon under investigation has often been “small-
business management.”4  Entrepreneurs are pictured as the managers of small, fam-
ily-owned businesses or start-up companies. Entrepreneurship consists of routine 
management tasks, relationships with venture capitalists and other sources of exter-
nal finance, product development, marketing, and so on.  In this sense, entrepreneur-
ship and the theory of the firm — the theory of some firms, at least — are inextricably 
                                                 
3 On the history of the entrepreneurship concept in economic theory, see Elkjaer (1991) and Ibrahim 
and Vyakarnam (2003). 
4  However, this appears to be slowly changing towards a more generic and theoretically based under-
standing of entrepreneurship.  
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linked.  The theory of entrepreneurship in this approach is the theory of how small 
business owners organize and manage their assets.  
Unfortunately, this notion of entrepreneurship is sufficiently elastic to be prac-
tically meaningless.  It appears to include virtually all aspects of small or new busi-
ness management, while excluding the identical tasks when performed within a large 
or established business.  Put differently, if entrepreneurship is simply a set of man-
agement activities, or any management activity that takes place with in a particular 
type of firm, then it is unclear why we should bother to add this label to those activi-
ties.   
Entrepreneurship as imagination or creativity. It is common, particularly 
within the management literature, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, dar-
ing, imagination, or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; 
Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
These accounts emphasize the personal, psychological characteristics of the entre-
preneur. Entrepreneurship, in this conception, is not a necessary component of all 
human decision-making, but a specialized activity that some individuals are particu-
larly well equipped to perform.5 
If these characteristics are the essence of entrepreneurship, then entrepreneur-
ship has no obvious link to the theory of the firm (or, at least not without further ar-
guments).  The relevant personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by con-
tract on the market by purchasing consulting services, project management, and the 
like.  A “non-entrepreneurial” owner or manager, in other words, can manage the 
day-to-day operations of the firm, purchasing “entrepreneurship” on the market as 
needed.  Moreover, the literature does not explain clearly whether imagination and 
creativity are necessary, sufficient, or incidental conditions for entrepreneurship.  
Clearly the founders of many firms are imaginative and creative.  If not, are they not 
entrepreneurs? 
Entrepreneurship as innovation. Probably the best-known concept of entre-
preneurship in economics is Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innova-
tor.  Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new combinations”— new products, 
production methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — shak-
ing the economy out of its previous equilibrium through a process Schumpeter 
termed “creative destruction.”  The entrepreneur-innovator is introduced in Schum-
peter’s ground-breaking Theory of Economic Development (1912) and developed further 
in his two-volume work, Business Cycles (1939).  Realizing that the entrepreneur has 
no place in the general-equilibrium system of Walras, whom Schumpeter greatly 
                                                 
5 As Gartner (1988: 21) argues, however, this literature employs a host of different (and frequently) 
contradictory notions of entrepreneurship. A “startling number of traits and characteristics have been 
attributed to the entrepreneur, and a ‘psychological profile’ of the entrepreneur assembled from these 
studies would portray someone larger than life, full of contradictions, and, conversely, someone so 
full of traits that (s)he would have to be a sort of generic ‘Everyman.’” 
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admired, Schumpeter gave the entrepreneur a role as the source of economic 
change.6  
Schumpeter carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and 
strongly criticized the neoclassical economists for confusing the two).  His entrepre-
neur need not own capital, or even work within the confines of a business firm at all.  
While the entrepreneur could be a manager or owner of a firm, he is more likely to be 
an independent contractor or craftsman.  In Schumpeter’s conception, “… people act 
as entrepreneurs only when they actually carry out new combinations, and lose the 
character of entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up their business, after which 
they settle down to running it as other people run their businesses” (Ekelund and 
Hébert, 1990: 569). 
This suggests a rather tenuous relationship between the entrepreneur and the 
firm he owns, works for, or contracts with.  Entrepreneurship is exercised within the 
firm when it introduces new products, processes, or strategies, but not otherwise.  
The day-to-day operations of the firm need not involve entrepreneurship at all.  
Moreover, because Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is sui generis, independent of its 
environment, the nature and structure of the firm does not affect the level of entre-
preneurship.  Corporate R&D budgets, along with organizational structures that en-
courage managerial commitment to innovation (Hitt and Hoskisson, 1994), have little 
to do with Schumpeterian entrepreneurship per se.7  
Entrepreneurship as alertness or discovery. Entrepreneurship can also be con-
ceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities. While present in Cantillon’s and J. B. 
Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been elaborated most fully by 
Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1992) Kirzner’s formulation emphasizes the nature of com-
petition as a discovery process: the source of entrepreneurial profit is superior 
foresight—the discovery of something (new products, cost-saving technology) un-
known to other market participants.  The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who 
discovers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a 
more typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production 
process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes 
not from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from having some 
knowledge or insight that no one else has—that is, from something beyond the given 
means-end framework.8 
                                                 
6 This could include, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
7 Other writers influenced by Schumpeter, however, such as Baumol (1993a), do view public and pri-
vate R&D, the scale and scope of patent protection, and basic science education as important determi-
nants of the level of entrepreneurial activity.  
8 It is important to distinguish Kirzner’s view of superior foresight from Stigler’s search model in 
which the value of new knowledge is known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the rele-
vant search costs. “Stigler's searcher decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through 
dusty attics and untidy drawers looking for a sketch which (the family recalls) Aunt Enid thought 
might be by Lautrec.  Kirzner’s entrepreneur enters a house and glances lazily at the pictures which 
have been hanging in the same place for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 1987: 58). 
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Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit 
opportunities.  Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty.  Critics have 
seized on this point as a defect in Kirzner’s conception.  According to this criticism, 
mere alertness to a profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning profits. To reap 
financial gain, the entrepreneur must invest resources to realize the discovered profit 
opportunity.  “Entrepreneurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the 
money is obtained and committed to the projects” (Rothbard, 1985: 283).  Moreover, 
excepting the few cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous 
(say, electronic trading of currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transac-
tions require some time to complete.  The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur 
has made his sale, and thus even the pure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss.  
In Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure 
to discover an existing profit opportunity.  Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break 
even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses. 
For these reasons, the connection between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and 
the theory of the firm is uncertain.  Owners, managers, employees, and independent 
contractors can all be alert to new profit opportunities.  Kirzner’s entrepreneur does 
not need a firm to exercise his function in the economy.   
Entrepreneurship as charismatic leadership.  Another strand of literature, in-
corporating insights from economics, psychology, and sociology and leaning heavily 
on Max Weber, associates entrepreneurship with charismatic leadership.  Entrepre-
neurs, in this view, specialize in communication —the ability to articulate a plan, a 
set of rules, or a broader vision, and impose it on others.  Casson (2000) calls these 
plans “mental models” of reality.  The successful entrepreneur excels at communicat-
ing these models to others, who come to share the entrepreneur’s vision (and become 
his followers).  Such entrepreneurs are also typically optimistic, self-confident, and 
enthusiastic (though it is not clear whether these are necessary conditions). 
Witt (1998a, 1998b) describes entrepreneurship similarly as “cognitive leader-
ship.”  He outlines an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that combines recent litera-
ture on cognitive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of alertness.  Entrepreneurs re-
quire complementary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated within 
the firm.  For the firm to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a tacit, shared 
framework of goals, which governs the relationships among members of the entre-
preneur’s team.  As Langlois (1998) points out, it is often easier (less costly) for indi-
viduals to commit to a specific individual, the leader, rather than an abstract set of 
complex rules governing the firm’s operations.  The appropriate exercise of charis-
matic authority, then, reduces coordination costs within organizations. 
A possible weakness of this approach, in our view, is its emphasis on human 
assets, rather than the inalienable physical assets the entrepreneur controls.  Must the 
charismatic leader necessarily own physical capital, or can he be an employee or in-
dependent contractor?  Formulating a business plan, communicating a “corporate 
culture,” and the like are clearly important dimensions of business leadership.  But 
are they attributes of the successful manager or the successful entrepreneur?   Even if 
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top-level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneurship, it is unclear why char-
ismatic leadership should be regarded as more “entrepreneurial” than other, com-
paratively mundane managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting oppor-
tunism, administering rewards, and so on. 
Entrepreneurship as judgment.  An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that 
entrepreneurship consists of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncer-
tainty.  Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making when the range of pos-
sible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally un-
known (what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk).  This 
view finds expression in the earliest known discussion of entrepreneurship, that 
found in Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755). Cantillon 
argues that all market participants, with the exception of landowners and the nobil-
ity, can be classified as either entrepreneurs or wage earners:  
Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for 
certain wages until they have them, although their functions and their 
rank are very disproportionate.  The General who has a salary, the 
Courtier who has a pension, and the Domestic who has wages, are in 
the latter class.  All the others are Entrepreneurs, whether they establish 
themselves with a capital to carry on their enterprise, or are Entrepre-
neurs of their own work without any capital, and they may be consid-
ered as living subject to uncertainty; even Beggars and Robbers are En-
trepreneurs of this class (Cantillon, 1755: 54). 
Bearing risk—that is, making decisions under conditions of uncertainty—is the en-
trepreneur’s raison d’être. 
Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. 
Judgment must be exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as 
well as new ventures. While alertness tends to be passive (perhaps even hard to dis-
tinguish from luck, Demsetz 1983), judgment is active.  Entrepreneurs “are those who 
seek to profit by actively promoting adjustment to change.  They are not content to 
passively adjust their . . . activities to readily foreseeable changes or changes that 
have already occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an 
opportunity to meliorate their own conditions and aggressively attempt to anticipate 
and exploit it” (Salerno, 1993: 123).  Those who specialize in judgmental decision-
making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need not possess these traits.  
Decision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves imagina-
tion, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 9 
                                                 
9 In Mises’s (1949) formulation, entrepreneurship is introduced to explain the existence of profit and 
loss. In the marginal productivity theory of distribution, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest, 
and owners of specific factors earn rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized receipts over these 
factor payments constitutes profit (loss). Profit and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In 
a hypothetical equilibrium without uncertainty (what Mises calls the “evenly rotating economy”), 
capitalists would still earn interest, as a reward for lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 
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Entrepreneurial Judgment as a Natural Complement to the Theory of the Firm 
While the view of entrepreneurship as judgment appears in many writers, it is 
most often associated with Knight (1921).  For Knight, firm organization, profit, and 
the entrepreneur are closely related.  In his view, these arise as an embodiment, a 
result, and a cause, respectively, of commercial experimentation (Demsetz, 1988).10   
Knight introduces the notion of judgment to link profit and the firm to the exis-
tence of uncertainty.  Judgment primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming 
estimates of future events in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all on 
probabilities of occurrence.  It may be defined as a service that enhances the quality of 
decisions in novel situations that require an urgent decision, a service that is learned 
and has a large tacit component.  Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be 
assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a 
wage.11 This is because entrepreneurship is judgment in relation to the most uncertain 
events, such as starting a new firm, defining a new market, and the like.  
In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, 
and utilizing judgment therefore requires the person with judgment to start a firm.  
Moreover, judgment implies asset ownership.  Judgmental decision-making is ulti-
mately decision-making about the employment of resources.  An entrepreneur without 
capital goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.12  This implies an obvious link 
with the theory of the firm, particularly those (transaction cost and property rights 
theories) that define asset ownership as a crucial ingredient of firm organization 
(Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995).  The firm, in this sense, is the entrepreneur and the 
assets he owns, and therefore ultimately controls.  The theory of the firm is essen-
tially a theory of how the entrepreneur exercises his judgmental decision-making—
what combinations of assets will he seek to acquire, what (proximate) decisions will 
                                                 
10 Knight explains that “[w]ith uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect 
knowledge, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control 
of productive activities . . . Its existence in the world is a direct result of the fact of uncertainty” (1921: 267, 
271).   
11  “The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of superior judgment. But it 
is judgment of judgment, especially one's own judgment, and in an individual case there is no way of 
telling good judgment from good luck and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or 
determine its probable value transforms the profit into a wage. . . . If . . . capacities were known, the 
compensation for exercising them can be competitively imputed and is a wage; only, in so far as they 
are unknown or known only to the possessor himself, do they give rise to a profit” (Knight, 1921: 311). 
12 Carl Menger’s (1871) treatment of production gives the entrepreneur a similar role.  Production 
requires an “act of will” and “supervision of the execution of the production plan.” These functions 
“entail property ownership and, therefore, mark the Mengerian entrepreneur as a capitalist–
entrepreneur” (Salerno, 1998: 30). Menger describes “command of the services of capital” as a “neces-
sary prerequisite” for economic activity. Even in large firms, although he may employ “several help-
ers,” the entrepreneur himself continues to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation, and su-
pervise production, even if these functions “are ultimately confined . . . to determining the allocation 
of portions of wealth to particular productive purposes only by general categories, and to selection 
and control of persons” (Menger, 1871: 160–61).  
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he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide incentives and employ monitoring 
to see that his assets are used consistently with his judgments, and so on.  
 
Putting Entrepreneurship into the Theory of the Firm:              
Judgment and Economic Organization 
Established Theories of the Firm 
The neoclassical theory of the firm. As noted earlier, the neoclassical theory of 
the firm that forms the basis of competitive general equilibrium models has no place 
for the entrepreneur.  In economics textbooks, the “firm” is a production function or 
production possibilities set, a “black box” that transforms inputs into outputs.  The 
firm is modeled as a single actor, facing a series of decisions that are portrayed as 
uncomplicated: what level of output to produce, how much of each factor to hire, 
and the like.  These “decisions,” of course, are not really decisions at all; they are triv-
ial mathematical calculations, implicit in the underlying data.  In the long run, the 
firm may choose an optimal size and output mix, but even these are determined by 
the characteristics of the production function (economies of scale, scope, and se-
quence).  In short: the firm is a set of cost curves, and the “theory of the firm” is a 
calculus problem.  There is nothing for an entrepreneur to do. 
While descriptively vacuous, the production-function approach has the appeal 
of analytical tractability along with its elegant parallel to neoclassical consumer the-
ory (profit maximization is like utility maximization, isoquants are like indifference 
curves, and so on).  Nonetheless, many economists now see it as increasingly unsatis-
factory, as unable to account for a variety of real-world business practices: vertical 
and lateral integration, mergers, geographic and product-line diversification, fran-
chising, long-term commercial contracting, transfer pricing, research joint ventures, 
and many others.  The inadequacy of the traditional theory of the firm explains much 
of the recent interest in agency theory, transaction cost economics, the property-
rights approach, and other approaches that all hark back to Coase’s landmark 1937 
article, “The Nature of the Firm.” 
The Coasian (contractual) framework. Coase (1937) introduced what is a fun-
damentally new way to think about the firm.  Coase argued that in the world of neo-
classical price theory, firms have no reason to exist.  The reason why firms existed 
after all, he reasoned, must be that there is a “cost to using the price mechanism” 
(Coase 1937: 390).  Market exchange entails certain costs:  discovering the relevant 
prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on.  Within the firm, the entrepre-
neur may be able to reduce these “transaction costs” by coordinating these activities 
himself.  However, internal organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, 
namely problems of information flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance 
evaluation.  The boundary of the firm, then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the 
margin, between the relative transaction costs of external and internal exchange.  In a 
single brief paper, Coase laid out the basic desiderata of the economic theory of the 
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firm, namely accounting in a comparative-institutional manner for the allocation of 
transactions across alternative governance structures.  Although terminology and 
specific insights may differ, most modern theories of the firm may be said to be 
Coasian in the sense that they adhere to this program.  But what about the entrepre-
neur in Coase’s thought?  
Coase’s position is somewhat ambiguous.13 Although he explicitly uses the 
word, his “entrepreneur” seems to be more engaged in the mechanical exercise of 
comparing the costs of organizing given transactions in given governance structures 
than in engaging in future-oriented speculative acts (Boudreaux and Holcombe, 1991).  
On the other hand, Coase stresses certain aspects of economic organization that are 
best understood in the context of entrepreneurial activities. Notably, his discussion of 
the employment contract makes appeal to unpredictability and the need for qualita-
tive coordination in a world of uncertainty (Langlois and Foss, 1999).  This provides 
ample room for the entrepreneur as a speculating and coordinating agent.  However, 
this potential was not fulfilled, neither in Coase’s own thought, nor, as we shall see, in 
later post-Coasian contribution to the economic theory of the firm.   
Modern organizational economics. The post-Coasian theory of the firm—or 
more generally, organizational economics— follows Coase in conceptualizing the firm 
as a contractual entity whose existence, boundaries, and internal organization can be 
explained in terms of economizing on (various types of) transaction costs.  This is not 
to say that any one theory in modern organizational economics has addressed all 
these three key issues in terms of the same unified framework and making use of the 
same kind of transaction costs.  Indeed, a possible perspective on the division of labor 
that exists within the modern theory of the firm is that while the principal-agent  ap-
proach (Holmström and Milgrom 1991) and team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1972) 
are mainly relevant for understanding internal organization, the transaction cost (Wil-
liamson 1985) and property rights approaches (Hart 1995; Hart and Moore, 1990) ap-
ply to questions of firm boundaries.  
Relatedly, these approaches have stressed different kinds of transaction costs 
that in different ways lead to contractual imperfection and therefore economic out-
comes that must always be sub-optimal relative to the full-information, zero-
transaction-cost ideal.  Thus, principal-agent theory emphasizes costs of monitoring 
contractual relationships when moral hazard is a potential problem; the property 
rights approach emphasizes costs of writing (complete) contracts; and the transaction 
cost approach also emphasizes writing costs, but perhaps particularly the costs of 
haggling that may arise ex post the signing of a contract when the parties need to ad-
just to unanticipated contingencies.14 
                                                 
13 Coase dismissed Knight’s (1921) explanation. It is arguable that he misunderstood Knight (Foss 
1996). 
14 This is a bit of a rational reconstruction on our part: Formal contract theorists, such as principal-
agent or property right theorists, are uncomfortable with the notion of “transaction cost.”   
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Of the four approaches, only the transaction costs approach and the property 
rights approach are conventionally considered as theories of the firm in the strict 
sense.  The basic reason is that neither team theory nor principal-agent theory explain 
asset ownership; that is, they do not explain the boundaries of the firm (Hart, 1995).  
Such an explanation must presuppose that contracts are incomplete, because other-
wise everything can be stipulated contractually and there will be no need for owner-
ship understood as something that confers the “residual right” to make decisions that 
are not specified by contract.  Team theory and principal agent theory assume com-
plete contracts, whereas transaction cost economics and property rights theory work 
from an incomplete-contracting foundation.    
Following Oliver Williamson (1985, 1996), particular emphasis has come to be 
placed in these approaches upon specific (or highly complementary) assets in ex-
plaining the boundaries of the firm.15  In this story, assets are highly specific when 
there is a high difference between their value in the present (best) use and the sec-
ond-best use.  This opens the door to, and provides the incentive for, opportunism in 
the form of “hold-up”.  Once the contract is signed and the assets deployed, one of 
the parties may threaten to pull out of the arrangement — thereby reducing the value 
of the specific assets — unless a greater share of the quasi-rents of joint production 
find their way into the threat-maker’s pockets.  Fear of such “hold up” ex post will 
affect investment choices negatively ex ante.  This means that the joint surplus flow-
ing from the relation will not be as high as it could if there were no fear of opportun-
ism.  Integration may not so much do away with opportunism proclivities as it might 
change the incentives to engage in opportunism.  By giving property rights to the 
(non-human) assets in the relation to the party whose investments matter most to the 
size of the joint surplus, the negative effects of opportunism can be minimized 
though never completely eliminated (Hart 1995).  The basic problem in this story is 
that contracts are left incomplete, for example, because the transaction costs of draft-
ing complete contracts are prohibitive. It is the need to make decisions under circum-
stances that are not covered by the contract that makes hold-up and its consequences 
possible. 
Entrepreneurship as an unrealized potential in the modern theory of the firm. 
In a number of ways, modern organizational economics applies an analytical appara-
tus that is potentially capable of illuminating important aspects of entrepreneurship, 
and particularly entrepreneurship as judgment.  For example, the emphasis on asset 
ownership as a crucial aspect of firm organization accords well with Knight’s (1921) 
views.  So does the emphasis on incomplete contracting.  And notions of asymmetric 
information help to illuminate what is distinctive about entrepreneurship relative to 
other kinds of decision-making.  In a number of ways, however, the modern econom-
ics of organization is a direct descendant of the neoclassical theory of the firm that it 
supplanted.  For example, as capabilities theorists (Langlois and Foss, 1999) have 
pointed out, the modern economics of organization has not made a break with the 
                                                 
15 For expository reasons, we here suppress the differences between Williamson’s and Hart’s versions 
of this story.  
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neoclassical theory of production, but merely a grafted super-structure of asymmet-
ric information, transaction costs, etc. onto this.  Moreover, the modern economics of 
organization is almost as deterministic and “closed” as the neoclassical theory of the 
firm: although notions of uncertainty, ignorance, and surprise may occasionally be 
invoked in the literature, these merely serve as rhetorical devices to make the notion 
of contractual incompleteness plausible (Foss 2003). They are not themselves ad-
dressed and explained, and certainly not invoked to make room for process and en-
trepreneurship.  Still, key organizational economics insights may be usefully applied 
in an extended theory of economic organization, one that makes room for entrepre-
neurial judgment. 
In the following, we adopt the view of entrepreneurship as judgment and, as it 
were, seek to put this notion of entrepreneurship into organizational economics.  We 
address the three classical themes of the existence, boundaries and internal organiza-
tion of the firm seriatim.  Consistent with the view that entrepreneurship as judgment 
must involve asset ownership we take a starting point in the notion of (capital) as-
sets.16 
Assets, Attributes, and Entrepreneurship 
The entrepreneur’s primary function is to choose among the various combina-
tions of inputs suitable for producing particular goods (and to decide whether these 
goods should be produced at all), based on current prices for the factors and ex-
pected future prices of the final goods (Knight 1921).17  If capital is a single “good,” 
with one price, then entrepreneurship is reduced to choosing between capital-
intensive and labor-intensive production methods (or among types of labor).18    
                                                 
16 For an attempt to ground this explicitly in Austrian capital theory, see Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein 
(2002). 
17 This formulation makes it clear that financiers — those who determine how much capital is avail-
able to each firm and each branch of industry — are also entrepreneurs.  In the traditional, produc-
tion-function theory of the firm, capital markets do little but supply financial capital to managers, who 
can get as much capital as they wish at the going market price. In a more sophisticated understanding, 
managers do not decide how much capital they want; capitalists decide where capital should be allo-
cated. In doing so, they provide essential discipline to the manager, who Mises (1949: 304) calls the 
entrepreneur’s “junior partner” (Klein, 1999). 
18 Moreover, in a world of homogenous capital assets (resources), economic organization would be 
relatively unimportant.  All capital assets possess the same attributes, and thus the costs of inspecting, 
measuring, and monitoring the attributes of productive assets is trivial.  Exchange markets for assets 
would be virtually devoid of transaction costs.  A few basic contractual problems — in particular, 
principal-agent conflicts over the supply of labor services — would remain, though workers would all 
use identical capital assets.  However, it is hard to see what role ownership of capital assets would 
play in this world.  If the costs of measuring and specifying attributes are low, entrepreneurs and fac-
tor owners could contract over attributes, and there would be little incentive to acquire ownership of 
assets themselves. Transactions involving such assets would be governed by complete, contingent 
contracts. Because contracts would substitute for ownership in a homogenous capital world, the 
boundaries of firms would be indeterminate (Hart 1995).  
  
13
 
Lachmann (1956: 13, 16), by contrast, stressed that real-world entrepreneurship con-
sists primarily of choosing among combinations of capital assets:  
We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combina-
tions . . . will be ever changing, will be dissolved and re-formed.  In this 
activity, we find the real function of the entrepreneur. 
[T]he entrepreneur’s function . . . is to specify and make decisions on the 
concrete form the capital resources shall have.  He specifies and modi-
fies the layout of his plant . . . As long as we disregard the heterogene-
ity of capital, the true function of the entrepreneur must also remain 
hidden.   
Thus, the entrepreneur’s decision problem is significantly complicated by the hetero-
geneity of capital assets.   While the common sense approach to capital heterogeneity 
is to conceptualize it in terms of physical heterogeneity — beer barrels and blast fur-
naces are different on account of their physical differences — an economic approach 
emphasizes that heterogeneity is rooted in capital assets having different levels and 
kinds of valued attributes (in the terminology of Barzel 1997).  
Attributes. Attributes are characteristics, functionalities, possible uses of as-
sets, etc. as perceived by an entrepreneur.  For example, a copying machine has mul-
tiple attributes in the sense that it can be used at different time, by different people, 
for different types of copying work, that it can be purchased in different colors, sizes, 
and so on. Clearly, virtually all assets have multiple attributes. Assets are heteroge-
neous to the extent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes. 
Attributes may also vary over time, even for a particular asset.  In a world of “true” 
uncertainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely to know all relevant attributes of all assets 
when production decisions are made.  Nor can the future attributes of an asset, as it 
is used in production, be forecast with certainty.19 Future attributes must be discov-
ered, over time, as assets are used in production. Or, to formulate the problem 
slightly differently, future attributes are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways 
of using assets to produce goods. 
Ownership and entrepreneurship. Focusing on attributes not only helps to il-
lustrate the concept of heterogeneous capital, but also illuminates the vast literature 
on property rights and ownership.  Barzel (1997) stresses that property rights are 
held over attributes, and property rights to known attributes of assets are the relevant 
units of analysis in his work.  In contrast, he dismisses the notion of asset ownership 
as essentially legal and extra-economic.  Similarly, Demsetz argues that the notion of 
“full private ownership” over assets is “vague,” and “must always remain so,” be-
cause “there is an infinity of potential rights of actions that can be owned … It is im-
possible to describe the complete set of rights that are potentially ownable” (Demsetz 
1988: 19).   
                                                 
19   This sense of uncertainty links naturally with the notion of contractual incompleteness.  We explore 
the implications of this idea below.  
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 However, as we noted above, most assets have unspecified, not-yet-
discovered attributes, and an important function of entrepreneurship is to create or 
discover these attributes.  Contrary to Demsetz, it is exactly this feature that creates a 
distinct role for asset ownership – that is, for acquiring legal title to a bundle of exist-
ing attributes as well as to future attributes.  Specifically, ownership is a low-cost 
means of allocating the rights to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by 
the entrepreneur-owner.  For instance, those who create or discover new knowledge 
have an incentive to use it directly because it is costly to transfer knowledge to others.   
In a well-functioning legal system, ownership of an asset normally implies that the 
courts will not interfere when an entrepreneur-owner captures the value of newly 
created or discovered attributes of an asset he owns.  Consequently, the entrepre-
neur-owner can usually avoid costly negotiation with those who are affected his 
creation or discovery.  This keeps the dissipation of value at bay.  Of course, asset 
ownership itself provides a powerful incentive to create or discover new attributes, 
as ownership conveys the legally recognized (and at least partly enforced) right to 
the income of an asset, including the right to income from new attributes.20  We next 
apply these ideas to the three classical issues in the theory of the firm, the existence, 
boundaries and internal organization of the firm.  
The Existence of the Firm 
 Incomplete markets for judgment. Agents may realize rents from their human 
capital through three means: (1) selling labor services on market conditions, (2) entering 
into employment contracts, or (3) starting a firm. As Barzel (1987) argues, moral hazard 
may imply that options (1) and (2) are not efficient means of realizing rents. That is to 
say, entrepreneurs know themselves to be good risks but are unable to communicate 
this to the market. Thus, one reason why the firm emerges is that the person whose ser-
vices are the most difficult to measure (and therefore are most susceptible to moral haz-
ard and adverse selection problems) will assume the position of entrepreneur, employ-
ing and supervising other agents, and committing capital of his own to the venture, 
thus contributing a bond.   
However, there are other reasons why the market may not be able to evaluate 
entrepreneurial services. For example, Kirzner (1979: 181) argues that “entrepreneur-
ship reveals to the market what the market did not realize was available, or indeed, 
needed at all,” while Casson (1982: 14) takes a more Schumpeterian position, arguing 
that “[t]he entrepreneur believes he is right, while everyone else is wrong. Thus the es-
sence of entrepreneurship is being different — being different because one has a differ-
ent perception of the situation” (see also Casson 1997).  In this situation, non-contract-
ibility arises because “[t]he decisive factors . . . are so largely on the inside of the person 
making the decision that the ‘instances’ are not amenable to objective description and 
                                                 
20  Moreover, ownership simplifies the process of entrepreneurial arbitrage (Kirzner, 1973)—and hence 
helps to close pockets of ignorance in the market—by allowing entrepreneurs to acquire, in one trans-
action, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e., a distinct asset). This means that the parties need not en-
gage in costly bargaining over many rights to single attributes. The dissipation of value is thus mini-
mized. 
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external control” (Knight 1921:  251) (see also Foss 1993). Thus, moral hazard may be 
one important factor underlying non-contractibility, but need not be the only one. An 
agent may be unable to communicate his “vision” of a commercial experiment — a spe-
cific way of combining heterogeneous capital assets to serve future consumer wants — 
in such a way that other agents can assess its economic implications; as a result, he can-
not be an employee, but will have to start his own firm. Thus, the existence of the firm 
can be explained in terms of a specific category of transaction costs, namely, those that 
close the market for entrepreneurial judgment.  
Firms as controlled experiments. The notion of closed markets for judgments re-
lating to new uses of combinations of heterogeneous capital helps us to understand the 
one-person firm.  However, similar ideas may also be useful for understanding the 
multi-person firm, that is, it may help us understand the emergence of the employment 
contract.  
To see this, consider again the notion of capital (resource) heterogeneity.  If capi-
tal is homogenous, the coordination of plans is relatively straightforward.  In the real 
world of heterogeneous capital assets, production plans are much more difficult to 
coordinate. In the “production function view” of the firm, this problem is side-
stepped by assuming that the assets controlled by the firm are already in their best 
uses.  More realistically, however, full knowledge ex ante about, for example, the op-
timal sequence of tasks is not likely to exist.21  Given that the relationships among 
assets are generally unknown ex ante, some experimentation is necessary.  First, one 
must isolate the system boundaries, that is, where the relevant relationships among 
assets are most likely to be located.  Second, the experimental process must be like a 
controlled experiment (or a sequence of such experiments) to isolate the system from 
outside disturbances.  Third, there must be some sort of guidance for the experiment.  
This may take many forms, ranging from centrally provided instructions to negoti-
ated agreements to shared understandings of where in the system to begin experi-
menting, how to avoid overlapping experiments, how to revised the experiment in 
light of past results, and so on.  The central problem is how this experimental process 
is best organized.  Does the need for experimentation explain the existence of the 
firm, or can such experimentation be organized efficiently through markets?  
In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction costs, all rights to all 
uses of all assets could be specified in contracts.  By contrast, in a world of heteroge-
neous assets with attributes that are costly to measure and partly unforeseen, com-
plete contracts cannot be drafted.  In turn, the resulting incomplete contracting may 
necessitate organization within the firm, or managed coordination through the en-
trepreneur’s central direction.  If relationship-specific assets are involved, the holdup 
problem described above becomes a serious concern.  (Asset specificity may itself be 
an outcome of an experimental process.)  More specifically, as experimental activity 
provides information about how to optimize the system, assets will be increasingly 
                                                 
21 Strikingly, the problem of defining an optimal sequence of tasks in even relatively simple produc-
tion systems may require more calculation capacity than is available in a supercomputer (Galloway 
1996). 
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specific in terms of time and location.  Temporal and site specificity will tend to in-
crease as assets become more efficiently coordinated.  This provides one rationale for 
organizing the experiments inside firms, though not the only one.  Firms may also be 
justified by problems associated with the dispersion of knowledge across agents.  
Production systems may exhibit multiple equilibria, so that it is not obvious how to 
coordinate on equilibria or even which equilibria are the most preferred ones.   
In principle, one may imagine that an experimenting team hires an outside 
consultant that guides the experimental activity by giving advice on the sequence of 
actions and asset uses, initiating the experiments, drawing the appropriate conclu-
sions from each experiments, determining how these conclusions should influence 
further experimentation, and so on.  However, such an arrangement is likely to run 
into numerous bargaining costs, not the least because under market contracting, any 
team member may be able to veto the advice provided by the consultant.  Succumb-
ing to authority may be the cost effective way of organizing the experimental activ-
ity.  “Authority” here means that the entrepreneur has the right to redefine and real-
locate decision rights among team members, and the right to sanction team members 
who do not use their decision rights efficiently.  By possessing these rights, entrepre-
neur-managers can conduct experiments without continuously having to renegotiate 
contracts, saves bargaining and drafting costs.  Such an arrangement then provides a 
setting for carrying out “controlled” experiments in which the entrepreneur-manager 
only changes some aspects of tasks to trace the effects of some specific rearrange-
ments of rights.  Arranging property rights in this way is tantamount to forming a 
firm.     
Changes in Firm Boundaries and Entrepreneurial Experimentation 
The theory of firm boundaries is closely related to the theory of entrepreneur-
ship, though it is not usually expressed in this fashion.  Mergers, acquisitions, dives-
titures, and other reorganizations are best viewed as responses to a valuation dis-
crepancy.  Acquisition, for example, occurs when the value of an existing firm’s as-
sets is greater to an outside party than to its current owners.  Put differently, merger 
can be a response to economies of scope, in that the value of the merging firms’ assets 
combined exceeds their joint values separately.  
New combinations of corporate assets can generate efficiencies by replacing 
poorly performing managers, creating operating synergies, or establishing internal 
capital markets.  Like other business practices that do not conform to textbook mod-
els of competition, mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructurings have long been 
viewed with suspicion by some commentators and regulatory authorities.  However, 
the academic literature clearly suggests that corporate restructurings do, on average, 
create value (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001).  
Given such benefits, why are many mergers later “reversed” in a divestiture, spin-
off, or carve-out?  Klein and Klein (2001a) distinguish between two basic views.  The 
first, which may be termed empire building, holds that entrenched managers make 
acquisitions primarily to increase their own power, prestige or control, producing 
negligible efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-controlled firms are 
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likely to be divested ex post.  Most important, because the acquiring firm’s motives 
are suspect, such acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers can predict, 
based on pre-merger characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be viable over 
time.  (Moreover, by permitting these acquisitions, capital-market participants are 
also guilty of systematic error.)  
A second view, which Klein and Klein (2002) term entrepreneurial market proc-
ess, acknowledges that unprofitable acquisitions may be “mistakes” ex post, but ar-
gues that poor long-term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency.  In the 
market-process perspective, a divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean 
simply that profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of future con-
ditions or otherwise learned from experience.  As Mises (1949: 252) puts it, “the out-
come of action is always uncertain. Action is always speculation.”  Consequently, 
“the real entrepreneur is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the 
future structure of the market for business operations promising profits. This specific 
anticipative understanding of the conditions of the uncertain future defies any rules 
and systematization” (p. 585, emphasis added).  
Klein and Klein (2002) discuss empirical evidence that the long-term success 
or failure of corporate acquisitions cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of 
manager control or principal-agent problems.  However, significantly higher rates of 
divestiture tend to follow mergers that occur in a cluster of mergers in the same in-
dustry.  As argued by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 
(2001), and Andrade and Stafford (2004), mergers frequently occur in industry clus-
ters, suggesting that mergers are driven in part by industry-specific factors, such as 
regulatory shocks.  When an industry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, eco-
nomic calculation becomes more difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is hampered.  
It should not be surprising that poor long-term performance is more likely under 
those conditions. 
This notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty squares 
with recent theories of acquisitions as a form of experimentation (Mosakowski 1997; 
Boot, Milbourn, and Thakor 1999; Matsusaka, 2001).  In these models, profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs can learn their own capabilities only by trying various combinations of 
activities, which could include diversifying into new industries. Firms may thus 
make diversifying acquisitions even if they know these acquisitions are likely to be 
reversed in a divestiture.  This process generates information that is useful for revis-
ing entrepreneurial plans, and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful even if 
individual acquisitions are not.  In these cases, the long-term viability of an acquisi-
tion may be systematically related to publicly observable, pre-merger characteristics 
associated with experimentation, but not characteristics associated with managerial 
discretion. 
Internal Organization   
Productive and destructive entrepreneurship. In much of the entrepreneurship 
literature, there is a general, though usually implicit claim that all entrepreneurial 
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activity is socially beneficial (Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973).  However, as Baumol (1990) 
and Holcombe (2002) point out, entrepreneurship may be socially harmful; notably, 
entrepreneurial “rent-seeking” seeks to influence governments (or management) to 
redistribute income but in the process consumes resources, introducing a social loss.  
It is therefore necessary to introduce a distinction between productive and destruc-
tive entrepreneurship.   
When agents expend effort discovering new attributes and taking control over 
these in such a way that joint surplus (net social benefit) is reduced, we shall speak of 
“destructive entrepreneurship.” Thus, discovering new forms of moral hazard 
(Holmström 1982), creating hold-ups (Williamson 1996), and inventing new ways of 
engaging in rent-seeking activities relative to government (Baumol 1990, Holcombe 
2002) are examples of destructive entrepreneurship in the sense that these represent 
the discovery of new attributes that decrease joint surplus.  “Productive entrepre-
neurship” refers to the creation or discovery of new attributes leading to an increase 
in joint surplus.  For example, a franchisee may discover new local tastes that in turn 
may form the basis for new products for the entire chain; an employee may figure 
out better uses of production assets and communicate this to the TQM team of which 
he is a member; a CEO may formulate a new business concept; etc.  In the following 
we sketch how this distinction provides a way of developing an entrepreneurial ap-
proach to internal organization.  Note that we here use the term “entrepreneurship” 
a bit more broadly than before, referring not only to decisions made by resource 
owners (entrepreneurship in the strict sense), but also to decisions made by employ-
ees, acting as proxy decision-makers for the resource owners. 
Fundamental tradeoffs in internal organization. The first such problem con-
cerns the control of destructive entrepreneurial activities.  For example, firms may 
delimit employees’ use of telephone and internet services by closely specifying their 
use rights over the relevant assets, instruct them to act in a proper manner towards 
customers and to exercise care when operating the firm’s equipment, etc.  However, 
firms are unlikely to be entirely successful in their attempt to curb such activities.  
One reason for this is the costs of monitoring employees.  Another reason is that em-
ployees may creatively circumvent constraints; for example, they may invent ways of 
covering their (mis-)use of the internet. Although firms may know that such destruc-
tive entrepreneurship takes place, they may prefer not to try to constrain it further.  
This is because the various constraints that firms impose on employees (or, more 
generally, contracting partners on each other) to curb destructive entrepreneurship 
may have the unwanted side effect that productive entrepreneurship is stifled (cf. 
Kirzner 1985).  
More generally, imposing (too many) constraints on employees may reduce 
their propensity to create or discover new attributes of productive assets.  At any 
rate, many firms increasingly appear to operate on the presumption that beneficial 
effects may be produced by reducing constraints on employees in various dimen-
sions. For example, firms such as 3M allocate time to research employees that they 
are basically free to use in almost any way they see fit in the hope that this will pro-
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duce serendipitous discoveries. Many consulting firms do something similar.  Of 
course, many industrial firms have known for a long time that the jobs of research 
employees must be constrained in different, and typically much looser, ways from 
those of employees with more routine tasks.  More broadly, the increasing emphasis 
on ”empowerment” during the last decades reflects a realization that employees de-
rive a benefit from controlling aspects of their job situation.  Relatedly, it is a key 
point in the total quality movement that delegating various rights to employees pro-
vides sufficient motivation for these employees to engage in activities that amount to 
finding new ways to increase the mean and reduce the variance of quality (Jensen 
and Wruck 1994).  To the extent that such activities increase joint surplus, they repre-
sent productive entrepreneurship. 
Stimulating the productive discovery of new attributes of assets through put-
ting fewer constraints on employees amounts to making the relation between princi-
pals and agents (a firm and its employees; a firm and its R&D departments; a firm 
and its supplier, etc.) less completely specified.   This is not just a matter of sheer 
delegation, that is, transferring specific decision rights.  Rather, it amounts to provid-
ing the possibilities for agents of exercising often quite far-reaching judgment.  How-
ever, as we have seen there are also potential negative aspects of discretion in the 
form of destructive entrepreneurial activities.  Therefore, an important choice exists 
with respect to the tradeoff between productive and destructive entrepreneurial ac-
tivities.    
Choosing efficient tradeoffs.  In this context, asset ownership is important be-
cause it confers a recognized right to the entrepreneur to define contractual con-
straints, that is, choose his preferred tradeoff.  To put it in a compact manner, owner-
ship is a means of implementing the employer-entrepreneur’s preferred degree of 
contractual incompleteness, and therefore a certain combination of productive and 
destructive entrepreneurship, in a low-cost way.  This function of ownership is par-
ticularly important in the kind of process context stressed by Knight (in the later 
chapters of Knight 1921) and the Austrians (Hayek 1948; Kirzner 1973; O’Driscoll and 
Rizzo 1985; Littlechild 1986).  This is because in such a context an ongoing process of 
discovery and judgment will require that contractual constraints are redefined to 
track the changing tradeoff between productive and destructive entrepreneurship 
inside the firm. The power conferred by ownership allows the employer-
entrepreneur to do this in a low cost manner (for a fuller analysis, see Foss and Foss 
2002).   
Conclusion 
The theory of entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm thus have much 
to learn from each other.  A good theory of entrepreneurship should explain the con-
ditions under which entrepreneurship takes place:  does the entrepreneur need a 
firm?  We have argued that the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment provides 
the clearest link between entrepreneurship and asset ownership.  Similarly, the eco-
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nomic theory of the firm can be improved substantially by taking seriously the essen-
tial heterogeneity of capital goods and the subsequent need for entrepreneurial ex-
perimentation. 
Will these insights be incorporated into the economic theory of the firm?  We 
are optimistic, but guardedly so.  Because these concepts lie fundamentally outside 
the standard constrained optimization framework, they are inherently difficult to 
model mathematically.  Modern economists have difficulty appreciating ideas that 
are not expressed in this familiar language.  Indeed, most recent theoretical advances 
in the economic theory of the firm have been developed within the more formal 
framework associated with Grossman, Hart, and Moore, not the more “open” 
framework associated with Williamson.22  Relaxing this constraint may lead to con-
siderable advances in economists’ understanding of the firm. 
                                                 
22 Bajeri and Tadelis (2001) is a prominent exception.  See Foss (1994) for the case that Williamson’s 
work represents an ontologically “open” interpretation of Coase, distinguished in this way from other 
developments of the Coasian tradition. 
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